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Abstract
Large-scale quantum computing is a significant threat to classical public-key cryptography.
In strong “quantum access” security models, numerous symmetric-key cryptosystems are also
vulnerable. We consider classical encryption in a model which grants the adversary quantum
oracle access to encryption and decryption, but where the latter is restricted to non-adaptive
(i.e., pre-challenge) queries only. We define this model formally using appropriate notions of
ciphertext indistinguishability and semantic security (which are equivalent by standard argu-
ments) and call it QCCA1 in analogy to the classical CCA1 security model. Using a bound
on quantum random-access codes, we show that the standard PRF- and PRP-based encryption
schemes are QCCA1-secure when instantiated with quantum-secure primitives.
We then revisit standard IND-CPA-secure Learning with Errors (LWE) encryption and show
that leaking just one quantum decryption query (and no other queries or leakage of any kind)
allows the adversary to recover the full secret key with constant success probability. In the
classical setting, by contrast, recovering the key uses a linear number of decryption queries,
and this is optimal. The algorithm at the core of our attack is a (large-modulus version of)
the well-known Bernstein-Vazirani algorithm. We emphasize that our results should not be
interpreted as a weakness of these cryptosystems in their stated security setting (i.e., post-
quantum chosen-plaintext secrecy). Rather, our results mean that, if these cryptosystems are
exposed to chosen-ciphertext attacks (e.g., as a result of deployment in an inappropriate real-
world setting) then quantum attacks are even more devastating than classical ones.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Large-scale quantum computers pose a dramatic threat to classical cryptography. The ability of
such devices to run Shor’s efficient quantum factoring algorithm (and its variants) would lead
to devastation of the currently deployed public-key cryptography infrastructure [Che+16; Sho94].
This threat has led to significant work on so-called “post-quantum” alternatives, where a prominent
category is occupied by lattice-based cryptosystems. Many of these systems are based on the
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Learning with Errors (LWE) problem of solving noisy linear equations over Zq [Reg09] and its
variants. The LWE problem is widely believed to be intractable even for quantum computers, and
thus forms the basis for a number of candidate post-quantum cryptosystems [Che+16; NIS17].
In addition to motivating significant work on post-quantum cryptosystems, the threat of quan-
tum computers has also spurred general research on secure classical cryptography in the presence
of quantum adversaries. One area in particular explores strong security models where a quantum
adversary gains precise quantum control over portions of a classical cryptosystem. In such models,
a number of basic symmetric-key primitives can be broken by simple quantum attacks based on
Simon’s algorithm [KM10; KM12; Kap+16; SS17; Sim97]. It is unclear if the assumption behind
these models is physically plausible when it comes to the standard physical implementations of
symmetric-key cryptography. However, attacks which involve quantumly querying a classical func-
tion are always available in scenarios where the adversary has access to a circuit for the relevant
function. This is certainly the case for hash functions, public-key encryption, and circuit obfusca-
tion. Moreover, understanding this model is crucial for gauging the degree to which any physical
device involved in cryptography must be resistant to reverse engineering or forced quantum be-
havior (consider, e.g., the so-called “frozen smart card” example [GHS16]). For instance, one may
reasonably ask: what happens to the security of a classical cryptosystem when the device leaks only
a single quantum query to the adversary?
When deciding which functions the adversary might have (quantum) access to, it is worth recall-
ing the classical setting. For classical symmetric-key encryption, a standard approach considers the
security of cryptosystems when exposed to so-called chosen-plaintext attacks (CPA). This notion
encompasses all attacks in which an adversary attempts to defeat security (by, e.g., distinguishing
ciphertexts or extracting key information) using oracle access to the function which encrypts plain-
texts with the secret key. This approach has been highly successful in developing cryptosystems
secure against a wide range of realistic real-world attacks. An analogous class, the so-called chosen-
ciphertext attacks (CCA), are attacks in which the adversary can make use of oracle access to the
decryption function. For example, a well-known attack due to Bleichenbacher [Ble98] only requires
access to an oracle that decides if the input ciphertext is encrypted according to a particular RSA
standard. We will consider analogues of both CPA and CCA attacks, in which the relevant functions
are quantumly accessible to the (quantum) adversary.
Prior works have formalized the quantum-accessible model for classical cryptography in several
settings. These include message authentication codes and digital signatures unforgeable against
quantum chosen-message attacks [BZ13b; BZ13a], encryption secure against quantum chosen-
plaintext attacks (QCPA) [BJ15; GHS16], and encryption secure against both quantum chosen-
plaintext and adaptive quantum chosen-ciphertext attacks (QCCA2) [BZ13b].
1.2 Our Contributions
In this work, we consider a quantum-secure model of encryption that grants non-adaptive access
to the decryption oracle, and is thus intermediate between QCPA and QCCA2. We remark that
studying weaker and intermediate models is a standard and quite useful practice in theoretical
cryptography. In fact, standard CPA and (adaptive) CCA are intermediate models themselves,
since they are both strictly weaker than authenticated encryption. In this particular case, we can
show that the intermediate model allows for (and is naturally motivated by) a new and interesting
quantum attack on LWE encryption.
The model. In our new model, the adversary is granted quantum oracle access to encryption
for the duration of the security game, as well as quantum oracle access to decryption – but (unlike
2
in QCCA2) only prior to the challenge. The challenge can take the form of an indistinguisha-
bility test, where the adversary supplies two challenge plaintexts (m0,m1), receives a challenge
ciphertext Enck(mb) for random b, and must correctly guess b. Alternatively, the challenge can
be semantic, where the adversary receives partial information about a plaintext m, and is tasked
with outputting some additional information about m by making use of its encryption Enck(m).
These two games lead to natural security notions for symmetric-key encryption, which we call
IND-QCCA1 and SEM-QCCA1, respectively. Following previous works, it is straightforward to de-
fine both IND-QCCA1 and SEM-QCCA1 formally, and prove that they are equivalent [BJ15; GHS16;
BZ13b].
We then show that IND-QCCA1-secure symmetric-key encryption can be constructed under the
assumption that quantum-secure one-way functions exist. Specifically, we show that the standard
encryption schemes based on quantum-secure pseudorandom functions (QPRF) and quantum-secure
pseudorandom permutations (QPRP) are IND-QCCA1. We remark that both QPRFs and QPRPs
can be constructed from quantum-secure one-way functions [Zha12; Zha16]. Our security proofs
use a novel technique, in which we control the amount of information that the adversary can extract
from the oracles and store in their internal quantum state (prior to the challenge) by means of a
certain bound on quantum random-access codes.
A QCCA1 attack on LWE. We then revisit the aforementioned question: what happens to a
post-quantum cryptosystem if it leaks only a single quantum query? Our main result is that
standard IND-CPA-secure LWE-based encryption schemes can be completely broken using only a
single quantum decryption query and no other queries or leakage of any kind. In our attack, the
adversary recovers the complete secret key with constant success probability. In standard bit-by-
bit LWE encryption, a single classical decryption query can yield at most one bit of the secret
key; the classical analogue of our attack thus requires n log q queries. The attack is essentially
an application of a modulo-q variant of the Bernstein-Vazirani algorithm [BV97]; our analysis
shows that this algorithm correctly recovers the key with constant success probability, despite the
decryption function only returning an inner product which is rounded to one of two values. We
consider three variants of standard IND-CPA-secure LWE-based encryption to which the attack is
applicable: the symmetric-key and public-key systems originally described by Regev [Reg09] and
the FrodoPKE scheme1 [LP11; Alk+17].
We remark that Grilo, Kerenidis and Zijlstra recently observed that a version of LWE with
quantum samples (as a learning problem) can be solved efficiently using a variant of the Bernstein-
Vazirani algorithm [GKZ17]. By contrast, our results demonstrate a cryptographic attack on stan-
dard cryptosystems based on LWE in a plausible security setting. In technical terms, our analysis
shows that constant success probability is achievable with only a single query, whereas [GKZ17]
require a number of queries which is at least linear in the modulus q. In particular, our attack
succeeds with a single query even for superpolynomial modulus.
Important caveats. Our results challenge the notion that LWE is unconditionally “just as se-
cure” quantumly as it is classically. Nonetheless, the reader is cautioned to interpret this work
carefully. Most importantly, our results should not be interpreted as a weakness of LWE (or any
LWE-based cryptosystems) in the standard post-quantum security model. Since it is widely believed
that quantum-algorithmic attacks will still need to be launched over purely classical channels, post-
1The FrodoPKE scheme is an IND-CPA-secure building block in the IND-CCA1-secure post-quantum cryptosystem
proposal “FrodoKEM” [Alk+17]. Our results do not affect the post-quantum security of the Frodo proposal, and in
particular, do not contradict the CCA1 security of FrodoKEM.
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quantum security does not allow for quantum queries to encryption or decryption oracles. Moreover,
while our attack does offer a dramatic quantum speedup (i.e., one query vs linear queries), the clas-
sical attack is already efficient. In particular, the schemes we attack are already insecure in the
purely classical chosen-ciphertext setting, but we note that it is possible to modify the schemes to
achieve security in the chosen-ciphertext setting [FO99].
1.3 Technical summary of results
We now outline our results with some further technical details.
1.3.1 Security model and basic definitions
First, we set down the basic QCCA1 security model, adapting the ideas of [BZ13a; GHS16]. Re-
call that an encryption scheme is a triple Π = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) of algorithms (key generation,
encryption, and decryption, respectively) satisfying Deck(Enck(m)) = m for any key k ← KeyGen
and message m. In what follows, all oracles are quantum, meaning that a function f is accessed via
the unitary operator |x〉|y〉 7→ |x〉|y⊕f(x)〉. We define ciphertext indistinguishability and semantic
security as follows.
Definition 1 (informal). Π is IND-QCCA1 if no quantum polynomial-time algorithm (QPT) A can
succeed at the following experiment with probability better than 1/2 + negl(n).
1. A key k ← KeyGen(1n) and a uniformly random bit b $←−{0, 1} are generated; A gets access to
oracles Enck and Deck, and outputs (m0,m1);
2. A receives Enck(mb) and gets access to an oracle for Enck only, and outputs a bit b′; A wins
if b = b′.
Definition 2 (informal). Consider the following game with a QPT A.
1. A key k ← KeyGen(1n) is generated; A gets access to oracles Enck, Deck and outputs circuits
(Samp, h, f);
2. Sample m ← Samp; A receives h(m), Enck(m), and access to an oracle for Enck only, and
outputs a string s; A wins if s = f(m).
Then Π is SEM-QCCA1 if for every QPT A there exists a QPT S with the same winning probability
but which does not get Enck(m) in step 2.
The following fact is straightforward.
Theorem 1. A classical symmetric-key encryption scheme is IND-QCCA1 if and only if it is
SEM-QCCA1.
1.3.2 Secure constructions
Next, we show that standard pseudorandom-function-based encryption is QCCA1-secure, provided
that the underlying PRF is quantum-secure (i.e., is a QPRF.) A QPRF can be constructed from
any quantum-secure one-way function, or directly from the LWE assumption [Zha12].
Given a PRF f = {fk}k, define PRFscheme[f ] to be the scheme which encrypts a plaintext m
using randomness r via Enck(m; r) = (r, fk(r)⊕m) and decrypts in the obvious way. We show the
following.
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Theorem 2. If f is a QPRF, then PRFscheme[f ] is IND-QCCA1-secure.
We also analyze a standard pseudorandom-permutation-based scheme. Quantum-secure PRPs
(i.e., QPRPs) can be obtained from quantum-secure one-way functions [Zha16]. Given a PRP
P = {Pk}k, define PRPscheme[P ] to be the scheme that encrypts a plaintext m using randomness
r via Enck(m; r) = Pk(m||r), where || denotes concatenation; to decrypt, one applies P−1k and
discards the remaining bits of randomness. We show the following.
Theorem 3. If P is a QPRP, then PRPscheme[P ] is IND-QCCA1-secure.
We briefly describe our proof technique for Theorems 2 and 3. In the IND-QCCA1 security game,
we can view the decryption oracle as a tool that allows the adversary to use quantum operations
to encode information about the relevant pseudorandom function instance (i.e., fk or Pk) in their
private (polynomial-sized) quantum memory. From this point of view, establishing security means
showing that this encoded information cannot help the adversary compute the value of the relevant
function at the particular randomness used in the challenge. To prove this, we use a bound on
quantum random access codes (QRAC). Informally, a QRAC is a mapping from N -bit strings x to
d-dimensional quantum states %x, such that given %x, and any index j ∈ [N ], the bit xj can be
recovered with some probability px,j =
1
2 + x,j . The average bias of such a code is the expected
value of x,j , over uniform x and j. A QRAC with shared randomness further allows the encoding
and decoding procedures to both depend on some random variable. We use the following bound.
Lemma 1. The average bias of a quantum random access code with shared randomness that encodes
N bits into a d-dimensional quantum state is O(
√
N−1 log d). In particular, if N = 2n and d =
2poly(n) the bias is O(2−n/2 poly(n)).
1.3.3 Quantum algorithm for linear rounding functions
In Section 5, we analyze the performance of a large-modulus variant of the Bernstein-Vazirani algo-
rithm when using a modified oracle. While the original oracle computes the inner product [BV97],
our modified variants only estimate its magnitude. In the simplest case, the oracle outputs 0 if the
inner product is small and 1 otherwise.
Linear rounding functions. Given an integer n ≥ 1 and modulus q ≥ 2, define a keyed family
of (binary) linear rounding functions, LRFk,q : Znq −→ {0, 1}, with key k ∈ Znq , as follows:
LRFk,q(x) :=
{
0 if |〈x,k〉| ≤ b q4c,
1 otherwise.
We also consider general variants of linear rounding functions that compute inner products in
Znq and return a rounded value that indicates a certain block within Zq. In any case, a modulo-q
variant of the Bernstein-Vazirani algorithm (see Algorithm 1) recovers k with constant probability
by means of only one quantum query to LRFk,q.
1.3.4 Key recovery against LWE
Next, we turn our attention to the basic encryption schemes based on the Learning with Errors
(LWE) assumption. We first consider the symmetric-key scheme LWE-SKE(n, q, χ) defined by an
integer n, a modulus q and a discrete error distribution χ over Zq of certain bounded magnitude.
The key for this scheme is a random vector k $←−Znq . We encrypt a bit b as follows:
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1. Sample a vector a $←−Znq and an error e← χ;
2. Output (a, 〈a,k〉+ b⌊ q2⌋+ e).
To decrypt a ciphertext (a, c) ∈ Zn+1q , we output 0 if and only if |c−〈a,k〉| ≤
⌊ q
4
⌋
(here we rely on
the assumption that the error magnitude is bounded: |e| ≤ ⌊ q4⌋). This scheme satisfies (classical)
IND-CPA security under the LWE assumption [Reg09].
Our first result regarding this scheme is that even a single quantum decryption query results in
a devastating break. This is due to the fact that the above decryption procedure coincides with a
binary linear rounding function for a key k′ = (−k, 1) and input x = (a, c).
Theorem 4 (informal). There exists an efficient quantum algorithm which makes one quantum
query to the decryption function Deck of LWE-SKE(n, q, χ) and outputs k with probability at least
4/pi2 − o(1).
In addition, we also consider standard public-key encryption schemes based on the LWE as-
sumption. We show that, in particular, both Regev’s scheme [Reg09] and FrodoPKE [Alk+17], are
vulnerable to a single-quantum decryption query attack. We emphasize that our result does not
“break” these cryptosystems in the usual sense: indeed, they are already vulnerable to classical
adversaries with access to a polynomial number of decryption queries. Our result simply shows
that even a single quantum decryption query is enough to recover the secret key.
Finally, we briefly investigate the possibilities of attacking LWE using quantum encryption
queries. Here, we show that there is a quantum advantage over classical, but only in a much more
contrived model. In this model, the adversary is granted access to the encryption randomness
used to select the coefficients of the LWE sample, but not the randomness used to select the error.
In that setting, each classical query produces at most log q bits of the secret key, while a single
quantum query can recover the entire key with non-negligible success probability as long as the
noise magnitude is bounded by a polynomial in n. This can be seen as a consequence of a slight
generalization of the analysis of Grilo et al. [GKZ17].
1.4 Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we outline preliminary ideas
that we will make use of, including cryptographic concepts, and notions from quantum algorithms.
In Section 3, we define the QCCA1 model, including the two equivalent versions IND-QCCA1 and
SEM-QCCA1. In Section 4, we define the PRF and PRP scheme, and show that they are IND-QCCA1-
secure. In Section 5, we show how a generalization of the Bernstein-Vazirani algorithm works with
probability bounded from below by a constant, even when the oracle returns some rounded value
of 〈k,x〉 (i.e. the oracle is a linear rounding function). In Section 6, we use the results of Section 5
to prove that a single quantum decryption query is enough to recover or partially recover the secret
key in various versions of LWE-encryption, and observe a similar result for a model in which the
adversary can make one quantum encryption query, including partial access to the randomness
register.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Basic notation and conventions
Selecting an element x uniformly at random from a finite set X will be written as x $←−X. If we are
generating a vector or matrix with entries in Zq by sampling each entry independently according
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to a distribution χ on Zq, we will write, e.g., v χ←−Znq . Given a matrix A, AT will denote the
transpose of A. We will view elements v of Znq as column vectors; the notation vT then denotes
the corresponding row vector.
The notation negl(n) denotes some function of n which is smaller than every inverse-polynomial.
We denote the concatenation of strings x and y by x||y. We abbreviate classical probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithms as PPT algorithms.
By quantum algorithm (or QPT) we mean a polynomial-time uniform family of quantum circuits,
where each circuit in the family is described by a sequence of unitary gates and measurements. In
general, such an algorithm may receive (mixed) quantum states as inputs and produce (mixed)
quantum states as outputs. Sometimes we will restrict QPTs implicitly; for example, if we write
Pr[A(1n) = 1] for a QPT A, it is implicit that we are only considering those QPTs that output a
single classical bit.
Every function f : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}` determines a unitary operator
Uf : |x〉|y〉 → |x〉|y ⊕ f(x)〉
on m + ` qubits where x ∈ {0, 1}m and y ∈ {0, 1}`. In this work, when we say that a quantum
algorithm A gets oracle access to f (written Af ), we mean that A can apply the oracle unitary Uf .
Recall that a symmetric-key encryption scheme is a triple of classical probabilistic algorithms
(KeyGen,Enc,Dec) whose run-times are polynomial in some security parameter n. Such scheme
must satisfy the following property: when a key k is sampled by running KeyGen(1n), then
Deck(Enck(m)) = m for all m except with negligible probability in n. In this work, all encryption
schemes will be fixed-length, i.e., the length of the message m will be a fixed (at most polynomial)
function of n.
Since the encryption security notions we require are unachievable in the information-theoretic
setting, all adversaries will be modeled by QPTs. When security experiments require multiple
rounds of interaction with the adversary, it is implicit that A is split into multiple QPTs (one for
each round), and that these algorithms are allowed to forward their internal (quantum) state to
the next algorithm in the sequence.
2.2 Quantum-secure pseudorandomness
A pseudorandom function is a family of deterministic and efficiently computable functions that
appear sufficiently random to any PPT adversary with adaptive oracle access. Similarly, a quantum-
secure pseudorandom function is a family of functions that is also secure against QPT adversaries
with adaptive quantum oracle access. More specifically, let f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}m → {0, 1}` be
an efficiently computable function, where n,m, ` are integers and f defines a family of functions
{fk}k∈{0,1}n with fk(x) = f(k, x). We say f is a quantum-secure pseudorandom function (or QPRF)
if, for every QPT A,∣∣∣∣∣ Pr
k
$←− {0,1}n
[
Afk(1n) = 1
]
− Pr
g
$←− F`m
[Ag(1n) = 1]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ negl(n) . (1)
Here F `m denotes the set of all functions from {0, 1}m to {0, 1}`. The standard method for con-
structing a pseudorandom function from a one-way function produces a QPRF, provided that the
one-way function is quantum-secure [GL89; GGM86; Zha12].
A quantum-secure pseudorandom permutation is a a bijective function family of quantum-secure
pseudorandom functions. More specifically, consider a function P : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m,
where n and m are integers, such that each function Pk(x) = P (k, x) in the corresponding family
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{Pk}k∈{0,1}n is bijective. We say P is a quantum-secure pseudorandom permutation (or QPRP) if,
for every QPT A with access to both the function and its inverse,∣∣∣∣∣ Pr
k
$←− {0,1}n
[
APk,P−1k (1n) = 1
]
− Pr
pi
$←− Pm
[
Api,pi−1(1n) = 1
]∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ negl(n) , (2)
where Pm denotes the set of permutations over m-bit strings. One can construct QPRPs from
quantum-secure one-way functions [Zha16].
2.3 Quantum random access codes
Recall that a quantum random access code (QRAC) is a scheme for the following scenario involving
two parties Alice and Bob [Nay99]:
1. Alice receives an N -bit string x and encodes it as a d-dimensional quantum state %x.
2. Bob receives %x from Alice, and some index i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and is asked to recover the i-th
bit of x, by performing some measurement on %x.
3. They win if Bob’s output agrees with xi and lose otherwise.
We can view a QRAC scheme as a pair of (not necessarily efficient) quantum algorithms: one for
encoding, and another for decoding. We remark that the definition of a QRAC does not require
a bound on the number of qubits; the interesting question is with what parameters a QRAC can
actually exist.
A variation of the above scenario allows Alice and Bob to use shared randomness in their
encoding and decoding operations [Amb+08] (note that shared randomness per se does not allow
them to communicate).
We will be interested in the average bias  = pwin − 1/2 of a QRAC with shared randomness,
where pwin is the winning probability averaged over x
$←−{0, 1}N and i $←−{1, . . . , N}.
2.4 Quantum Fourier transform
Recall that for an arbitrary modulus q, the quantum Fourier transform over the group Zq under
cyclic addition is given by the operation
QFTZq |x〉 =
1√
q
∑
y∈Zq
ωx·yq |y〉,
where ωq = e
2pii
q denotes a primitive root of unity. Due to early work by Kitaev [Kit95], this
variant of the Fourier transform can be implemented using quantum phase estimation in complexity
polynomial in log q. An improved approximate implementation of this operation is due to Hales
and Hallgren [HH00].
3 The QCCA1 security model
3.1 Quantum oracles
In our setting, adversaries will (at various times) have quantum oracle access to the classical
functions Enck and Deck. The case of decryption is simple: since Deck is a deterministic function,
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this means quantum oracle access to the unitary operator UDeck : |c〉|m〉 7→ |c〉|m ⊕ Deck(c)〉. For
encryption, to satisfy IND-CPA security (even classically), Enck must be probabilistic and thus
does not correspond to any single unitary operator. Instead, each encryption oracle call of the
adversary will be answered according to a unitary sampled uniformly at random from the family
{UEnck,r}r where
UEnck,r : |m〉|c〉 7→ |m〉|c⊕ Enck(m; r)〉
and r varies over all the possible values of the randomness register of Enck. Note that, since Enck
and Deck are required to be probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms provided by the underlying
classical symmetric-key encryption scheme, both UEnck,r and UDeck correspond to efficient and
reversible quantum operations. For the sake of brevity, we adopt the convenient notation Enck and
Deck to refer to the above quantum oracles for encryption and decryption respectively.
3.2 Ciphertext indistinguishability
We now define indistinguishability of encryptions (for classical, symmetric-key schemes) against
non-adaptive quantum chosen-ciphertext attacks.
Definition 3 (IND-QCCA1). Let Π = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be an encryption scheme, A a QPT, and
n the security parameter. Define the experiment IndGame(Π,A, n) as follows.
1. Setup: A key k ← KeyGen(1n) and a bit b $←−{0, 1} are generated;
2. Pre-challenge: A gets access to oracles Enck and Deck, and outputs (m0,m1);
3. Challenge: A receives Enck(mb) and gets access to an oracle for Enck only, and outputs a
bit b′;
4. Resolution: A wins if b = b′.
Then Π has indistinguishable encryptions under non-adaptive quantum chosen ciphertext attack (or
is IND-QCCA1) if, for every QPT A,
Pr[A wins IndGame(Π,A, n)] ≤ 1/2 + negl(n) .
By inspection, one immediately sees that our definition lies between the established notions of
IND-QCPA and IND-QCCA2 [BJ15; GHS16; BZ13b].
It will later be convenient to work with a variant of the game IndGame, which we now define.
Definition 4 (IndGame′). We define the experiment IndGame′(Π,A, n) just as IndGame(Π,A, n),
except that in the pre-challenge phase A only outputs a single message m, and in the challenge
phase A receives Enck(m) if b = 0, and Enck(x) for a uniformly random message x if b = 1.
Working with IndGame′ rather than IndGame does not change security. Specifically (as we show
in Appendix A.3), Π is IND-QCCA1 if and only if, for every QPT A,
Pr[A wins IndGame′(Π,A, n)] ≤ 1/2 + negl(n) .
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3.3 Semantic security
In semantic security, the adversary chooses a challenge template rather than a pair of challenge
plaintexts. A challenge template is a triple of classical circuits (Samp, h, f), where Samp outputs
plaintexts from some distribution DSamp, and h and f are functions whose domain is the support
of DSamp. The intuition is that Samp is some distribution of plaintexts m for which the adversary,
if given some information h(m) about m together with an encryption of m, can produce some new
information f(m).
Definition 5 (SEM-QCCA1). Let Π = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be an encryption scheme, and consider
the experiment SemGame(b) (with parameter b ∈ {real, sim}) with a QPT A, defined as follows.
1. Setup: A key k ← KeyGen(1n) is generated;
2. Pre-challenge: A gets access to oracles Enck and Deck, and outputs a challenge template
(Samp, h, f);
3. Challenge: A plaintext m $←− Samp is generated; A receives h(m) and gets access to an oracle
for Enck only; if b = real, A also receives Enck(m); A outputs a string s;
4. Resolution: A wins if s = f(m).
Π has semantic security under non-adaptive quantum chosen ciphertext attack (or is SEM-QCCA1)
if, for every QPT A, there exists a QPT S such that the challenge templates output by A and S
are identically distributed, and∣∣Pr[A wins SemGame(real)]− Pr[S wins SemGame(sim)]∣∣ ≤ negl(n) .
Our definition is a straightforward modification of SEM-QCPA as set down in [GHS16; BZ13b];
the modification is simply to grant both A and S oracle access to Deck in the pre-challenge phase.
Theorem 5. Let Π = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be a symmetric-key encryption scheme. Then, Π is
IND-QCCA1-secure if and only if Π is SEM-QCCA1-secure.
The classical proof of the above (see, e.g., [Gol09]) carries over directly to the quantum case.
This was already observed for the case of QCPA by [GHS16], and extends straightforwardly to the
case where both the adversary and the simulator gain oracle access to Deck in the pre-challenge
phase.2
4 Secure Constructions
4.1 PRF scheme
Recall the standard symmetric-key encryption scheme based on pseudorandom functions.
Construction 1 (PRF scheme). For a security parameter n and PRF f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n −→
{0, 1}n, the symmetric-key encryption scheme PRFscheme[f ] = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is defined as
follows:
1. KeyGen: output k $←−{0, 1}n;
2In fact, the proof works even if Deck access is maintained during the challenge, so the result is really that
IND-QCCA2 is equivalent to SEM-QCCA2.
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2. Enc: to encrypt m ∈ {0, 1}n, choose r $←−{0, 1}n and output (r, fk(r)⊕m);
3. Dec: to decrypt (r, c) ∈ {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n, output c⊕ fk(r);
For simplicity, we chose a particularly simple set of parameters for the PRF, so that key length,
input size, and output size are all equal to the security parameter. It is straightforward to check
that the definition (and our results below) are valid for arbitrary polynomial-size parameter choices.
We show that the above scheme satisfies QCCA1, provided that the underlying PRF is secure
against quantum queries.
Theorem 6. If f is a QPRF, then PRFscheme[f ] is IND-QCCA1-secure.
Proof. Fix a QPT adversary A against Π := PRFscheme[f ] = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) and let n denote
the security parameter. It will be convenient to split A into the pre-challenge algorithm A1 and
the challenge algorithm A2.
We will work with the single-message variant of IndGame, IndGame′, described below as Game 0.
In Appendix A.3, we show that Π is IND-QCCA1 if and only if no QPT adversary can win IndGame′
with non-negligible bias. We first show that a version of IndGame′ where we replace f with a
random function, described below as Game 1, is indistinguishable from IndGame′, so that the
winning probabilities cannot differ by a non-negligible amount. We then prove that no adversary
can win Game 1 with non-negligible bias by showing how any adversary for Game 1 can be used
to make a quantum random access code with the same bias.
1n A1
|ψ〉
m∗ Φb c
∗
A2 b′
Enck Deck Enck
Figure 1: IndGame′ from Definition 4.
Game 0: This is the game IndGame′(Π,A, n), which we briefly review for convenience (see also
Figure 1). In the pre-challenge phase, A1 gets access to oracles Enck and Deck, and outputs a
message m∗ while keeping a private state |ψ〉 for the challenge phase. In the challenge phase,
a random bit b $←−{0, 1} is sampled, and A2 is run on input |ψ〉 and a challenge ciphertext
c∗ := Φb(m∗) :=
{
Enck(m
∗) if b = 0,
Enck(x) if b = 1.
Here Enck(x) := (r
∗, fk(r∗) ⊕ x) where r∗ and x are sampled uniformly at random. In the
challenge phase, A2 only has access to Enck and must output a bit b′. A wins if δbb′ = 1, so
we call δbb′ the outcome of the game.
Game 1: This is the same game as Game 0, except we replace fk with a uniformly random
function F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n.
11
First, we show that for any adversaryA, the outcome whenA plays Game 0 is at most negligibly
different from the outcome when A plays Game 1. We do this by constructing a quantum oracle
distinguisher D that distinguishes between the QPRF {fk}k and a true random function, with
distinguishing advantage ∣∣Pr[1← Game 0]− Pr[1← Game 1]∣∣,
which must then be negligible since f is a QPRF. The distinguisher D receives quantum oracle
access to a function g, which is either fk, for a random k, or a uniformly random function, and
proceeds by simulating A playing IndGame′ as follows:
1. Run A1, answering encryption queries using classical calls to g in place of fk, and answering
decryption queries using quantum oracle calls to g:
|r〉|c〉|m〉 7→ |r〉|c〉|m⊕ c〉 7→ |r〉|c〉|m⊕ c⊕ g(r)〉 ;
2. Simulate the challenge phase by sampling b $←−{0, 1} and encrypting the challenge using a
classical call to g in place of fk; run A2 and simulate encryption queries as before;
3. When A2 outputs b′, output δbb′ .
It remains to show that no QPT adversary can win Game 1 with non-negligible probability. To
do this, we will design a quantum random access code from any adversary’s strategy, and use the
lower bound on the bias given in Lemma 1.
Intuition. We first give some intuition. In an encryption query, the adversary, either A1 or A2,
queries a message, or a superposition of messages
∑
m |m〉, and gets back
∑
m |m〉|r,m⊕ F (r)〉 for
a random r, from which he can easily get a sample (r, F (r)), so in essence, an encryption query is
just classically sampling a random point of F .
In a decryption query, which is only available to A1, the adversary sends a ciphertext, or a
superposition of ciphertexts,
∑
r,c |r, c〉 and gets back
∑
r,c |r, c〉|c⊕F (r)〉, from which he can learn∑
r |r, F (r)〉. Thus, a decryption query allows A1 to query F , in superposition. Later in the
challenge phase, A2 gets an encryption (r∗,m ⊕ F (r∗)) and must decide if m = m∗. Since A2 no
longer has access to the decryption oracle, which allows him to query F , there seem to be two
possible ways A2 could learn F (r∗):
1. A2 gets lucky in one of his at most poly(n) many queries to Enck and happens to sample
(r∗, F (r∗));
2. Or, the adversary is somehow able to use what he learned while he had access to Deck, and
thus F , to learn F (r∗), meaning that the poly(n)-sized quantum memory A1 sends to A2,
that can depend on queries to F , but which cannot depend on r∗, allows A2 to learn F (r∗).
The first possibility is exponentially unlikely, since there are 2n possibilities for r∗. As we will see
shortly, the second possibility would imply a very strong kind of quantum random access code. It
would essentially allow A1 to interact with F , which contains 2n values, and make a state, which
must necessarily be of polynomial size, such that A2 can use that state to recover F (r∗) for any of
the 2n possible values of r∗, with high probability. We now formalize this intuition. To clarify the
notation, we will use boldface to denote the shared randomness bitstrings.
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Bits to be encoded:
b1, . . . , b2n ∈ {0, 1}
Bit to be recovered:
j ∈ {1, . . . , 2n}
Shared randomness:
s,y1, . . . ,y2n , r1, . . . , r` ∈ {0, 1}n
QRAC Encoding QRAC Decoding
A1 A2 b
′
m (r,m⊕ f˜(r))
Enc query
r $←−{0, 1}n
(r, c) c⊕ f˜(r)
Dec query
mi (ri,mi ⊕ f˜(ri))
i-th Enc query
f˜(r1), . . . , f˜(r`)
|ψ〉
m∗
Φj
c∗
(j,m∗ ⊕ yj)
f˜(r) :=
{
yr if br = 0
yr ⊕ s if br = 1
Figure 2: Quantum random access code construction for the PRF scheme.
Construction of a quantum random access code. Let A be a QPT adversary with winning
probability p. Let ` = poly(n) be an upper bound on the number of queries made by A2. Recall that
a random access code consists of an encoding procedure that takes (in this case) 2n bits b1, . . . , b2n ,
and outputs a state % of dimension (in this case) 2poly(n), such that a decoding procedure, given
% and an index j ∈ {1, . . . , 2n} outputs bj with some success probability. We define a quantum
random access code as follows (see also Figure 2).
Encoding. Let b1, . . . , b2n ∈ {0, 1} be the string to be encoded. Let s,y1, . . . ,y2n ∈ {0, 1}n be
given by the first n(1 + 2n) bits of the shared randomness, and let r1, . . . , r` ∈ {0, 1}n be the
next `n bits. Define a function f˜ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n as follows. For r ∈ {0, 1}n, we will slightly
abuse notation by letting r denote the corresponding integer value between 1 and 2n. Define
f˜(r) = yr⊕ brs. Run A1, answering encryption and decryption queries using f˜ in place of F .
Let m∗ and |ψ〉 be the outputs of A1 (see Figure 1). Output % = (|ψ〉,m∗, f˜(r1), . . . , f˜(r`)).
Decoding. Let j ∈ {1, . . . , 2n} be the index of the bit to be decoded (so given % as above, the
goal is to recover bj). Decoding will make use of the values s,y1, . . . ,y2n , r1, . . . , r` given by
the shared randomness. Upon receiving a query j ∈ {1, . . . , 2n}, run A2 with inputs |ψ〉 and
(j,m∗ ⊕ yj). On A2’s i-th encryption oracle call, use randomness ri, so that if the input to
the oracle is |m, c〉, the state returned is |m, c⊕ (ri,m⊕ f˜(ri))〉 (note that f˜(ri) is given as
part of %). Return the bit b′ output by A2.
Average bias of the code. We claim that the average probability of decoding correctly, taken
over all choices of b1, . . . , b2n ∈ {0, 1} and j ∈ {1, . . . , 2n}, is exactly p, the success probability of
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A. To see this, first note that from A’s perspective, this is exactly Game 1: the function f˜ is a
uniformly random function, and the queries are responded to just as in Game 1. Further, note
that if bj = 0, then m
∗ ⊕ yj = m∗ ⊕ f˜(j), so the correct guess for A2 would be 0, and if bj = 1,
then m∗ ⊕ yj = m∗ ⊕ f˜(j) ⊕ s = x ⊕ f˜(j) for the uniformly random string x = m∗ ⊕ s, so the
correct guess for A2 would be 1.
Thus, the average bias of the code is p − 1/2. We also observe that % has dimension at most
2poly(n), since |ψ〉 must be a poly(n)-qubit state, since A1 only runs for poly(n) time, and `, the
number of queries made by A2 must be poly(n), since A2 only runs for poly(n) time. Since this
code encodes 2n bits into a state of dimension 2poly(n), by Lemma 1 (proven in Appendix A.1), the
bias is O(2−n/2 poly(n)) = negl(n), so p ≤ 12 + negl(n).
4.2 PRP scheme
We now prove the IND-QCCA1 security of a standard encryption scheme based on pseudorandom
permutations [GHS16].
Construction 2 (PRP scheme). Let n be the security parameter and let P : {0, 1}n ×{0, 1}2n −→
{0, 1}2n be a family of quantum-secure pseudorandom permutations (QPRP). Define the symmetric-
key encryption scheme PRPscheme[f ] = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) as follows:
1. KeyGen: output k $←−{0, 1}n;
2. Enc: to encrypt m ∈ {0, 1}n, choose r $←−{0, 1}n and output Pk(m||r);
3. Dec: to decrypt c ∈ {0, 1}2n, output the first n bits of P−1k (c).
As before, we chose a simple set of parameters; in general, the randomness length, plaintext
length, and security parameter can be related by arbitrary polynomials.
Theorem 7. If P is a QPRP, then PRPscheme[P ] is IND-QCCA1-secure.
Proof. We follow a similar proof strategy as with the PRF scheme. Fix a QPT adversary A against
Π := PRPscheme[P ] = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) and let n denote the security parameter. We have that Π
is IND-QCCA1 if and only if no QPT adversary can win IndGame′ with non-negligible bias. First, we
show that a version of IndGame′ where we replace P with a random permutation, described below
as Game 1, is indistinguishable from IndGame′, so that the winning probabilities cannot differ by
a non-negligible amount. We then prove that no adversary can win Game 1 with non-negligible
bias, by showing how any adversary for Game 1 can be used to make a quantum random access
code with the same bias.
Game 0: In the pre-challenge phase, A1 gets access to oracles Enck and Deck. In the challenge
phase, A1 outputs m and its private data |ψ〉; a random bit b $←−{0, 1} is sampled, and A2 is
run on input |ψ〉 and a challenge ciphertext
c∗ :=
{
Enck(m
∗) = Pk(m∗||r∗) if b = 0,
Enck(x) = Pk(x||r∗) if b = 1,
where r∗ $←−{0, 1}n and x is sampled uniformly at random. In the challenge phase, A2 has
oracle access to Enck only and outputs a bit b
′. The outcome of the game is simply the bit δbb′ .
Game 1: This is the same game as Game 0, except we now replace Pk with a perfectly random
permutation pi : {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}2n.
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We show that for any adversary A, the outcome when A plays Game 0 is at most negligibly
different from the outcome when A plays Game 1. We construct a quantum oracle distinguisher D
that distinguishes between Pk and a perfectly random permutation, with distinguishing advantage
|Pr[1← Game 0]− Pr[1← Game 1]| ,
which must then be negligible since Pk is a QPRP. Here, the distinguisher D receives quantum
oracle access to a function ϕ, which is either Pk for a random k, or a random permutation pi, and
proceeds by simulating A playing IndGame′ as follows:
1. Run A1, answering encryption queries using oracle calls to ϕ in place of Pk, where for a given
input and via randomness r,
Enc : |m〉|c〉 7→ |m〉|c⊕ ϕ(m||r)〉.
Answer decryption queries using quantum oracle calls to ϕ˜−1, a function that first computes
ϕ−1 but then (analogous to the PRP construction) discards the last n bits of the pre-image
corresponding to the randomness, i.e.
Dec : |c〉|m〉 7→ |c〉|m⊕ ϕ˜−1(c)〉.
2. Simulate the challenge phase by sampling b $←−{0, 1} and encrypting using a randomness r∗
together with a classical call to ϕ in place of Pk; run A2 and simulate encryption queries as
before.
3. When A2 outputs b′, output δbb′ .
It remains to show that no QPT adversary can win Game 1 with non-negligible probability.
To do this, we will again design a random access code from any adversary’s strategy with success
probability p, and use the lower bound on the bias given in Lemma 1. We will then construct a
QRAC with bias negl(n) from this adversary, and hence conclude that p ≤ 12 + negl(n).
Construction of a quantum random access code. Let A be a QPT adversary with winning
probability p and let ` = poly(n) be an upper bound on the number of queries made by A2.
When constructing a QRAC for the PRP scheme, we shall also assume for simplicity that both the
encoder and decoder share a random permutation (as part of the shared randomness). According
to the well known coupon collector’s problem, it is sufficient for the encoder and decoder to share
around N ln(N) random strings on average, where N denotes the number of distinct random strings
required to make up the desired permutation. We define a quantum random access code as follows
(see also Figure 3).
Encoding. Let b1, . . . , b2n ∈ {0, 1} be the string to be encoded and let the shared randomness be
given by a random string s together with a random permutation y = y1, . . . ,y22n ∈ {0, 1}2n
and a set of random strings r1, . . . , r` ∈ {0, 1}n. Using b1, . . . , b2n , we define a new random
permutation by letting P˜ (x||r) := yx⊕brs||r (P˜ remains a permutation3). RunA1 by answering
encryption and decryption queries using P˜ in place of pi (for decryption, use P˜−1 and discard
the last n bits). Let m∗ and |ψ〉 be the outputs of A1. Then, output % = (|ψ〉,m∗, br1 , . . . , brl).
Decoding. Let j ∈ {1, . . . , 2n} be the index of the bit to be decoded; so given % as above, we will
recover bj by making use of the shared randomness defined above. Upon receiving a query
j ∈ {1, . . . , 2n}, run A2 with inputs |ψ〉 and c∗ = ym∗||j . Return the bit b′ output by A2.
3This is easily verified as follows: P˜ (x||r) = P˜ (x′||r′) ⇐⇒ yx⊕brs||r = yx′⊕br′s||r′ ⇐⇒ (r = r
′) ∧ (x = x′)
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Bits to be encoded:
b1, . . . , b2n ∈ {0, 1}
Bit to be recovered:
j ∈ {1, . . . , 2n}
Shared randomness:
s,y1, . . . ,y2n , r1, . . . , r`
QRAC Encoding QRAC Decoding
A1 A2 b
′
m P˜ (m||r)
Enc query
r $←−{0, 1}n
c P˜−1(c)
Dec query
mi P˜ (mi||ri) = ymi⊕bris||ri
i-th Enc query
br1 , . . . , br`
|ψ〉
m∗
Φj
c∗
ym∗||j
P˜ (x||r) :=
{
yx||r if br = 0
yx⊕s||r if br = 1
Figure 3: Quantum random access code construction for the PRP scheme.
Average bias of the code. We claim that the average probability of decoding correctly, taken
over all choices of b1, . . . , b2n ∈ {0, 1} and j ∈ {1, . . . , 2n}, is exactly p, the success probability of
A. To see this, first note that from A’s perspective, this is exactly Game 1: the function P˜ is a
uniformly random permutation, and the queries are responded to just as in Game 1. Further, note
that if bj = 0, the challenge amounts to P˜ (m
∗||j) = ym∗||j , so the correct guess for A2 would be 0,
and if bj = 1, then yx||j is an encryption of a uniformly random string x = m∗ ⊕ s, so the correct
guess for A2 would be 1.
Thus, the average bias of the code is p − 1/2. We also observe that % has dimension at most
2poly(n), since |ψ〉 must be a poly(n)-qubit state, since A1 only runs for poly(n) time, and `, the
number of queries made by A2 must be poly(n), since A2 only runs for poly(n) time. Since this
code encodes 2n bits into a state of dimension 2poly(n), by Lemma 1, the bias is O(2−n/2 poly(n)) =
negl(n), so p ≤ 12 + negl(n).
5 Quantum algorithm for linear rounding functions
In this section, we analyze the performance of the Bernstein-Vazirani algorithm [BV97] with a
modified version of the oracle. While the original oracle computes the inner product modulo q, our
version only gives partial information about it by rounding its value to one of dq/be blocks of size
b, for some b ∈ {1, . . . , q − 1} (if b does not divide q, one of the blocks will have size < b).
Definition 6. Let n ≥ 1 be an integer and q ≥ 2 be an integer modulus. Let a ∈ Zq, b ∈ Zq \ {0}
and c := dq/be. We partition Zq into c disjoint blocks (most of them of size b) starting from a as
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follows (see Figure 4):
Iv(a, b) :=
{
{a+ vb, . . . , a+ vb+ b− 1} if v ∈ {0, . . . , c− 2},
{a+ vb, . . . , a+ q − 1} if v = c− 1.
Based on this partition, we define a family LRFk,a,b : Znq −→ Zc of keyed linear rounding functions,
with key k ∈ Znq , as follows:
LRFk,a,b(x) := v if 〈x,k〉 ∈ Iv(a, b).
a a
+
1
. . .
a
+
b−
1
b
a
+
b
. . .
a
+
2
b−
1
b
. . .
a
+
(c−
2)b
. . .
a
+
(c−
1)b−
1
b
a
+
(c−
1)b
. . .
a−
1
b− (cb− q)
I0(a, b) I1(a, b) Ic−2(a, b) Ic−1(a, b)
Figure 4: Dividing Zq into c = dq/be blocks, starting from a. The first c − 1 blocks, labelled
I0(a, b), . . . , Ic−2(a, b), have size b and the last, labelled Ic−1(a, b), contains the remaining b− (cb−
q) ≤ b elements of Zq.
The following theorem shows that the modulo-q variant of the Bernstein-Vazirani algorithm
(Algorithm 1) can recover k with constant probability of success by using only a single quantum
query to LRFk,a,b.
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Algorithm 1: Bernstein-Vazirani for linear rounding functions
Parameters: n, q, b ∈ {1, . . . , q − 1}, c = dq/be.
Input : Quantum oracle ULRF : |x〉|z〉 7→ |x〉|z + LRFk,a,b(x) (mod c)〉 where
x ∈ Znq , z ∈ Zc and LRFk,a,b is the rounded inner product function for
some unknown k ∈ Znq and a ∈ Zq.
Output : String k˜ ∈ Znq such that k˜ = k with high probability.
1. Prepare the uniform superposition and append 1√
c
∑c−1
z=0 ω
z
c |z〉 where ωc = e2pii/c:
1√
qn
∑
x∈Znq
|x〉 ⊗ 1√
c
c−1∑
z=0
ωzc |z〉.
2. Query the oracle ULRF for LRFk,a,b to obtain
1√
qn
∑
x∈Znq
ω
−LRFk,a,b(x)
c |x〉 ⊗ 1√
c
c−1∑
z=0
ωzc |z〉.
3. Discard the last register and apply the quantum Fourier transform QFT⊗nZq .
4. Measure in the computational basis and output the outcome k˜.
Theorem 8. Let ULRF be the quantum oracle for the linear rounding function LRFk,a,b with modulus
q ≥ 2, block size b ∈ {1, . . . , q − 1}, and an unknown a ∈ {0, . . . , q − 1}, and unknown key k ∈ Znq
such that k has at least one entry that is a unit modulo q. Let c = dq/be and d = cb−q. By making
one query to the oracle ULRF, Algorithm 1 recovers the key k with probability at least 4/pi
2−O(d/q).
Proof. For an integer m, let ωm = e
2pii/m. Several times in this proof, we will make use of the
identity
∑`−1
z=0 ω
rz
m = ω
r(`−1)/2
m
(
sin(`rpi/m)
sin(rpi/m)
)
.
Let c = dq/be. Throughout this proof, let LRF(x) = LRFk,a,b(x). By querying with 1√c
∑c−1
z=0 ω
z
c |z〉
in the second register, we are using the standard phase kickback technique, which puts the output
of the oracle directly into the phase:
|x〉 1√
c
c−1∑
z=0
ωzc |z〉 ULRF7−→ |x〉
1√
c
c−1∑
z=0
ωzc |z + LRF(x) (mod c)〉
= |x〉 1√
c
c−1∑
z=0
ωz−LRF(x)c |z〉 = ω−LRF(x)c |x〉
1√
c
c−1∑
z=0
ωzc |z〉.
Thus, after querying the uniform superposition over the cipherspace with 1√
c
∑c−1
z=0 ω
z
c |z〉 in the
second register, we arrive at the state
1√
qn
∑
x∈Znq
ω−LRF(x)c |x〉
1√
c
c−1∑
z=0
ωzc |z〉.
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Note that ωc = ω
q/c
q . If we discard the last register and apply QFT
⊗n
Zq , we get
|ψ〉 = 1
qn
∑
y∈Znq
∑
x∈Znq
ω−(q/c)LRF(x)+〈x,y〉q |y〉.
We then perform a complete measurement in the computational basis. The probability of obtaining
the key k is given by
|〈k|ψ〉|2 =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1qn
∑
x∈Znq
ω
− q
c
LRF(x)+〈x,k〉
q
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1qn
c−1∑
v=0
ω
− q
c
v
q
∑
x∈Znq :LRF(x)=v
ω〈x,k〉q
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
. (3)
We are assuming that k has at least one entry that is a unit modulo q. For simplicity, suppose that
entry is kn. Let k1:n−1 denote the first n− 1 entries of k. Then, for any v ∈ {0, . . . , c− 2}:∑
x∈Znq :LRF(x)=v
ω〈x,k〉q =
∑
x∈Znq :〈x,k〉∈Iv(a,b)
ω〈x,k〉q
=
∑
y∈Zn−1q
ω〈y,k1:n−1〉q
∑
xn∈Zq :
xnkn∈Iv(a−〈y,k1:n−1〉,b)
ωxnknq . (4)
(Recall the definition of Iv(a, b) from Definition 6). Since kn is a unit, for each z ∈ Iv(a−〈y,k1:n−1〉),
there is a unique xn ∈ Zq such that xnkn = z. Thus, for a fixed y ∈ Zn−1q , letting a′ = a−〈y,k1:n−1〉,
we have: ∑
xn∈Zq :
xnkn∈Iv(a′,b)
ωxnknq =
a′+(v+1)b−1∑
z=a′+vb
ωzq = ω
a′+vb
q
b−1∑
z=0
ωzq ,
which we can plug into (4) to get:
∑
x∈Znq :LRF(x)=v
ω〈x,k〉q =
∑
y∈Zn−1q
ω〈y,k1:n−1〉q ω
a−〈y,k1:n−1〉+vb
q
b−1∑
z=0
ωzq = q
n−1ωa+vbq
b−1∑
z=0
ωzq . (5)
We can perform a similar analysis for the remaining case when v = c−1. Recall that d = cb−q ≥ 0
so vb = cb− b = d+ q − b = −(b− d) (mod q) and we get
∑
x∈Znq :LRF(x)=c−1
ω〈x,k〉q = q
n−1ωa−(b−d)q
b−d−1∑
z=0
ωzq . (6)
This is slightly different from the v < c − 1 case, shown in (5), but very similar. If we substitute
v = c− 1 in (5) and compare it to (6), we get∣∣∣∣∣qn−1ωa−(b−d)q
b−d−1∑
z=0
ωzq − qn−1ωa−(b−d)q
b−1∑
z=0
ωzq
∣∣∣∣∣
= qn−1
∣∣∣∣∣
b−1∑
z=b−d
ωzq
∣∣∣∣∣ = qn−1
∣∣∣∣∣
d−1∑
z=0
ωzq
∣∣∣∣∣ = qn−1
∣∣∣∣sin(pid/q)sin(pi/q)
∣∣∣∣
≤ qn−1pid/q
2/q
= qn−1
pi
2
d. (7)
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Above, we have used the facts sinx ≤ x, and |sinx| ≥ 2x/pi when |x| ≤ pi/2. Now, plugging (5)
into (3) for all the v < c− 1 terms, and using (7) and the triangle inequality for the v = c− 1 term,
we get:
|〈k|ψ〉| ≥
∣∣∣∣∣ 1qn
c−1∑
v=0
ω−qv/cq · qn−1ωa+vbq
b−1∑
z=0
ωzq
∣∣∣∣∣−
∣∣∣∣ 1qnω−q(c−1)/cq · qn−1pi2 d
∣∣∣∣
=
1
q
∣∣∣∣∣
c−1∑
v=0
ωv(b−q/c)q
sin(bpi/q)
sin(pi/q)
∣∣∣∣∣− pi2 dq
=
1
q
sin(bpi/q)
sin(pi/q)
∣∣∣∣∣
c−1∑
v=0
ωv(b−q/c)q
∣∣∣∣∣− pi2 dq . (8)
Since b− q/c = d/c, we can bound the sum as follows:∣∣∣∣∣
c−1∑
v=0
ωv(b−q/c)q
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
c−1∑
v=0
ωvd/cq
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥
∣∣∣∣∣
c−1∑
v=0
cos
(
2pi
q
vd
c
)∣∣∣∣∣
≥
∣∣∣∣∣
c−1∑
v=0
cos
(
2pi
q
d
)∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣c cos(2pidq
)∣∣∣∣ (9)
≥ c
√
1− (2pid/q)2. (10)
To get the inequality (9), we used 0 ≤ v ≤ c and the assumption that d/q ≤ 1/4 (if d/q > 1/4,
the claim of the theorem is trivial), which implies that 2pivc
d
q ≤ pi2 . The last inequality follows from
|cosx| ≥ √1− x2.
Next, we bound sin(bpi/q)sin(pi/q) . When b/q ≤ 1/2, bpi/q ≤ pi/2, so we have sin(bpi/q) ≥ 2b/q. We also
have sin(pi/q) ≤ pi/q. Thus,
sin(bpi/q)
sin(pi/q)
≥ 2b
pi
.
On the other hand, when b/q > 1/2, we must have c = 2 and b = q+d2 . In that case
sin(bpi/q) = sin
pi(q + d)
2q
= sin
(
pi
2
+
pi
2
d
q
)
= cos
pid
2q
≥
√
1−
(
pid
2q
)2
.
Since sin(pi/q) ≤ pi/q and q ≥ 2b,
sin(bpi/q)
sin(pi/q)
≥
√
1−
(
pid
2q
)2
pi/q
≥ 2b
pi
√
1−O(d/q).
Thus, in both cases, sin(bpi/q)sin(pi/q) ≥ 2bpi
√
1−O(d/q). Plugging this and (10) into (8), we get:
|〈k, ψ〉| ≥ 1
q
· 2b
pi
√
1−O(d/q) · c
√
1−O(d/q)−O(d/q)
=
2
pi
bc
q
−O(d/q) = 2
pi
q + d
q
−O(d/q) = 2
pi
−O(d/q),
completing the proof.
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6 Key recovery against LWE
In this section, we consider various LWE-based encryption schemes and show using Theorem 8 that
the decryption key can be efficiently recovered using a single quantum decryption query (Section 6.1
and Section 6.2). Then, in Section 6.3, we show that a single quantum encryption query can be
used to recover the secret key in a symmetric-key version of LWE, as long as the querying algorithm
also has control over part of the randomness used in the encryption procedure.
6.1 Key recovery via one decryption query in symmetric-key LWE
Recall the following standard construction of an IND-CPA symmetric-key encryption scheme based
on the LWE assumption [Reg09].
Construction 3 (LWE-SKE). Let n ≥ 1 be an integer, let q ≥ 2 be an integer modulus and let
χ be a discrete and symmetric error distribution. Then, the symmetric-key encryption scheme
LWE-SKE(n, q, χ) = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is defined as follows:
1. KeyGen: output k $←−Znq ;
2. Enc: to encrypt b ∈ {0, 1}, sample a $←−Znq and e χ←−Zq and output (a, 〈a,k〉+ b
⌊ q
2
⌋
+ e);
3. Dec: to decrypt (a, c), output 0 if |c− 〈a,k〉| ≤ ⌊ q4⌋, else output 1.
As a corollary of Theorem 8, an adversary that is allowed to make a single quantum decryption
query can recover the key with probability at least 4/pi2 − o(1):
Corollary 1. There exists a quantum algorithm that makes one quantum query to LWE-SKE.Deck
and recovers the entire key k with probability at least 4/pi2 − o(1).
Proof. Note that LWE-SKE.Deck coincides with a linear rounding function LRFk′,a,b for a key k
′ =
(−k, 1) ∈ Zn+1q , which has a unit in its last entry. In particular, b = dq/2e, and if q = 3 (mod 4),
a = dq/4e, and otherwise, a = −bq/4c. Thus, by Theorem 8, Algorithm 1 makes one quantum
query to LRFk′,a,b, which can be implemented using one quantum query to LWE-SKE.Deck, and
recovers k′, and thus k, with probability 4/pi2 −O(d/q), where d = dq/beb− q ≤ 1.
Note that the key in this scheme consists of n log q uniformly random bits, and that a classical
decryption query yields at most a single bit of output. It follows that any algorithm making t
classical queries to the decryption oracle recovers the entire key with probability at most 2t−n log q.
A straightforward key-recovery algorithm using a linear number of classical queries does in fact
recover the key with constant success probability; the details are described in Appendix A.2.
6.2 Key recovery via one decryption query in public-key LWE
The key-recovery attack described in Corollary 1 required nothing more than the fact that the
decryption procedure of LWE-SKE is just a linear rounding function whose key contains the de-
cryption key. As a result, the attack is naturally applicable to other variants of LWE. In this
section, we consider two public-key variants. The first is the standard construction of IND-CPA
public-key encryption based on the LWE assumption, as introduced by Regev [Reg09]. The second
is the IND-CPA-secure public-key encryption scheme FrodoPKE [Alk+17], which is based on a con-
struction of Lindner and Peikert [LP11]. In both cases, we demonstrate a dramatic speedup in key
recovery using quantum decryption queries.
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We emphasize once again that key recovery against these schemes was already possible classi-
cally using a linear number of decryption queries. Our results should thus not be interpreted as a
weakness of these cryptosystems in their stated security setting (i.e., IND-CPA). The proper inter-
pretation is that, if these cryptosystems are exposed to chosen-ciphertext attacks, then quantum
attacks can be even more devastating than classical ones.
Regev’s public-key scheme. The standard construction of an IND-CPA public-key encryption
scheme based on LWE is the following.
Construction 4 (LWE-PKE [Reg09]). Let m ≥ n ≥ 1 be integers, let q ≥ 2 be an integer mod-
ulus, and let χ be a discrete error distribution over Zq. Then, the public-key encryption scheme
LWE-PKE(n, q, χ) = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is defined as follows:
1. KeyGen: output a secret key sk = k $←−Znq and a public key pk = (A,Ak + e) ∈ Zm×(n+1)q ,
where A $←−Zm×nq , e χ←−Zmq , and all arithmetic is done modulo q.
2. Enc: to encrypt b ∈ {0, 1}, pick a random v ∈ {0, 1}m with Hamming weight roughly m/2
and output (vTA,vT(Ak + e) + bb q2c) ∈ Zn+1q .
3. Dec: to decrypt (a, c), output 0 if |c− 〈a, sk〉| ≤ ⌊ q4⌋, else output 1.
Although the encryption is now done in a public-key manner, all that matters for our purposes
is the decryption procedure, which is identical to the symmetric-key case, LWE-SKE. We thus have
the following corollary, whose proof is identical to that of Corollary 1:
Corollary 2. There exists a quantum algorithm that makes one quantum query to LWE-PKE.Decsk
and recovers the entire key sk with probability at least 4/pi2 − o(1).
Frodo public-key scheme. Next, we consider the IND-CPA-secure public-key encryption scheme
FrodoPKE, which is based on a construction by Lindner and Peikert [LP11]. Compared to LWE-PKE,
this scheme significantly reduces the key-size and achieves better security estimates than the initial
proposal by Regev [Reg09]. For a detailed discussion of FrodoPKE, we refer to [Alk+17]. We present
the entire scheme for completeness, but the important part for our purposes is the decryption
procedure.
Construction 5 (FrodoPKE [Alk+17]). Let n, m¯, n¯ be integer parameters, let q ≥ 2 be an integer
power of 2, let B denote the number of bits used for encoding, and let χ be a discrete symmetric
error distribution. The public-key encryption scheme FrodoPKE = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is defined as
follows:
1. KeyGen: generate a matrix A $←−Zn×nq and matrices S,E χ←−Zn×n¯q ; compute B = AS +E ∈
Zn×n¯q ; output the key-pair (pk, sk) with public key pk = (A,B) and secret key sk = S.
2. Enc: to encrypt m ∈ {0, 1}B·m¯·n¯ (encoded as a matrix M ∈ Zm¯×n¯q with each entry having 0s in
all but the B most significant bits) with public key pk, sample error matrices S′,E′ χ←−Zm¯×nq
and E′′ χ←−Zm¯×n¯q ; compute C1 = S′A+E′ ∈ Zm¯×nq and C2 = M+S′B+E′′ ∈ Zm¯×n¯q ; output
the ciphertext (C1,C2).
3. Dec: to decrypt (C1,C2) ∈ Zm¯×nq ×Zm¯×n¯q with secret-key sk = S, compute M = C2−C1S ∈
Zm¯×n¯q . For each (i, j) ∈ [m¯]× [n¯], output the first B bits of Mi,j.
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We now show how to recover m¯ of the n¯ columns of the secret key S using a single quantum
query to FrodoPKE.DecS . If m¯ = n¯, as in sample parameters given in [Alk+17], then this algorithm
recovers S completely.
Theorem 9. There exists a quantum algorithm that makes one quantum query to FrodoPKE.DecS
and recovers any choice of m¯ of the n¯ columns of S. For each of the chosen columns, if that column
has at least one odd entry, then the algorithm succeeds in recovering the column with probability at
least 4/pi2.
Proof. Let s1, . . . , sn¯ be the columns of S. Let U denote the map:
U : |c〉|z1〉 . . . |zn¯〉 7→ |c〉|z1 + LRFs1,0,q/2B (c)〉 . . . |zn¯ + LRFsn¯,0,q/2B (c)〉,
for any c ∈ Znq and z1, . . . , zn¯ ∈ Z2B . We first argue that one call to FrodoKEM.DecS can be used
to implement U⊗m¯. Then we show that one call to U can be used to recover any choice of the
columns of S with probability 4/pi2, as long as it has at least one entry that is odd.
Let Trunc : Zq 7→ Z2B denote the map that takes x ∈ Zq to the integer represented by the B
most significant bits of the binary representation of x. We have, for any C1 ∈ Zm¯×nq , C2 = 0m¯×n¯,
and any {zi,j}i∈[m¯],j∈[n¯] ⊆ Z2B :
UFrodoKEM.Dec : |C1〉|0m¯·n¯〉
⊗
i∈[m¯],j∈[n¯]
|zi,j〉 7→ |C1〉|0m¯·n¯〉
⊗
i∈[m¯],j∈[n¯]
|zi,j + Trunc([C1S]i,j)〉. (11)
Above, [C1S]i,j represents the ij-th entry of C1S. If c
1, . . . , cm¯ denote the rows of C1, then
[C1S]i,j = 〈ci, sj〉. Thus, Trunc([C1S]i,j) = LRFsj ,0,q/2B (ci), the linear rounding function with
block size b = q/2B, which is an integer since q is a power of 2, and a = 0. Note that we have also
assumed that the plaintext is subtracted rather than added to the last register; this is purely for
convenience of analysis, and can easily be accounted for by adjusting Algorithm 1 (e.g., by using
inverse-QFT instead of QFT.)
Discarding the second register (containing C2 = 0), the right-hand side of (11) becomes
|c1〉 . . . |cm¯〉
⊗
i∈[m¯],j∈[n¯]
|zi,j + LRFsj ,0,q/2B (ci)〉. (12)
Reordering the registers of (12), we get:
⊗
i∈[m¯]
|ci〉⊗
j∈[n¯]
|zi,j + LRFsj ,0,q/2B (ci)〉
 = U⊗m¯
⊗
i∈[m¯]
|ci〉
⊗
j∈[n¯]
|zi,j〉
 .
Thus, we can implement U⊗m¯ using a single call to FrodoKEM.DecS .
Next we show that for any particular j ∈ [n¯], a single call to U can be used to recover sj , the
j-th column of S, with probability at least 4/pi2, as long as at least one entry of sj is odd. To do
this, we show how one use of U can be used to implement one phase query to LRFsj ,0,q/2B . Then
the result follows from the proof of Theorem 8.
Let |ϕ〉 = 2−B/2∑2B−1z=0 |z〉, and define
|φj〉 = |ϕ〉⊗(j−1) ⊗ 1√
2B
2B−1∑
z=0
ωz2B |z〉 ⊗ |ϕ〉⊗(n¯−j).
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Then for any c ∈ Znq , we have:
1√
2B
2B−1∑
z=0
|z + LRFsi,0,q/2B (c)〉 =
1√
2B
2B−1∑
z=0
|z〉 = |ϕ〉,
since addition here is modulo 2B, and
1√
2B
2B−1∑
z=0
ωz2B |z + LRFsj ,0,q/2B (c)〉 =
1√
2B
2B−1∑
z=0
ω
z−LRF
sj ,0,q/2B
(c)
2B
|z〉.
Thus:
U(|c〉|φj〉) = |c〉|ϕ〉⊗(j−1) ⊗ 1√
2B
2B−1∑
z=0
ω
z−LRF
sj ,0,q/2B
(c)
2B
|z〉 ⊗ |ϕ〉⊗(n¯−j)
= ω
−LRF
sj ,0,q/2B
(c)
2B
|c〉|φj〉.
Thus, by the proof of Theorem 8, if we apply U to q−n/2
∑
c∈Znq |c〉|φj〉, Fourier transform the first
register, and then measure, assuming sj has at least one entry that is a unit4 we will measure sj
with probability at least pi2/4−O(d/q), where d = q/2Bdq/(q/2B)e − q = 0.
Thus, if we want to recover columns j1, . . . jm¯ of S, we apply our procedure for U
⊗m¯, which
costs one query to FrodoKEM.DecS , to the state∑
c∈Znq
1√
qn
|c〉|φj1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗
∑
c∈Znq
1√
qn
|c〉|φjm¯〉,
Fourier transform each of the c registers, and then measure.
6.3 Key recovery via a randomness-access query
While a linear number of classical decryption queries can be used to break LWE-based schemes, we
have shown that only a single quantum decryption query is required. A natural question to ask
is whether a similar statement can be made for encryption queries. Classically, it is known that
the symmetric key version of LWE described in Construction 3, LWE-SKE, can be broken using
a linear number of classical encryption queries when the adversary is also allowed to choose the
randomness used by the query: the adversary simply uses e = 0 each time, with a taking n linearly
independent values. In case the adversary is allowed to make quantum encryption queries with
randomness access, a single quantum query suffice to recover the entire key with non-negligible
probability, even when the adversary only has control over a part of the randomness used by the
encryption: the randomness used to prepare vectors a, but not the randomness used to select
the error e. Specifically, the adversary is given quantum oracle access to the randomness-access
encryption oracle URAEnck such that, on input (b;a), the adversary receives
EncRAk (b;a) = (a, 〈a,k〉+ b bq/2c+ e),
where e ← χ. We extend this to a quantum randomness-access oracle by answering each element
of the superposition using i.i.d. errors ea ← χ:
URAEnck : |m〉|a〉|c〉 7→ |m〉|a〉|c⊕ EncRAk (m; a)〉.
4since q is a power of 2, this is just an odd number
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This model is identical to the noisy learning model considered by Grilo et al. [GKZ17] and thus
matches the original proposal by Bshouty and Jackson [BJ98].
First, it is not hard to see that algorithms making classical queries to the above oracle can
extract at most log q bits of key from each query (specifically, from the last component of the
ciphertext), and thus still require a linear number of queries to recover the complete key with
non-negligible probability.
On the other hand, by a slight generalization of the proof of Theorem IV.1 from Ref. [GKZ17],
we can recover the entire key with inverse polynomial success probability using a single query to
URAEnck as long as the noise magnitude η is polynomial in n, since ϕ(q) = Ω(q/ log log q):
Theorem 10. Consider LWE-SKE(n, q, χ) with an arbitrary integer modulus 2 ≤ q ≤ exp(n) and
a symmetric error distribution χ of noise magnitude η. Then there exists a quantum algorithm that
makes one query to a randomness-accessible quantum encryption oracle for LWE-SKE(n, q, χ) and
recovers the entire key with probability at least ϕ(q)/(24ηq)− o(1).
Finally, we remark that in the slightly different model in which a single error e← χ is usen for
every branch of the superposition of a single query, independent of a, we can recover k using a single
query to the randomness access encryption oracle: simply query |0〉 1√
qn
∑
a∈Znq |a〉
1√
q
∑q−1
z=0 ω
z
q |z〉 to
get |0〉 1√
qn
∑
a∈Znq ω
−〈a,k〉
q |a〉 1√q
∑q−1
z=0 ω
z
q |z+e〉, apply the quantum Fourier transform to the second
register, and then measure the second register to get k with probability 1.
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A Appendix
A.1 Bound for quantum random access codes
A quantum random access code (QRAC) is the following scenario involving two parties, Alice and
Bob [Nay99]:
• Alice receives an N -bit string x and encodes it as a quantum state %x.
• Bob receives %x from Alice and is asked to recover the i-th bit of x, for some i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
by measuring the state.
• They win if Bob’s output agrees with xi and lose otherwise.
A variation of this scenario allows Alice and Bob to use shared randomness in their encoding
and decoding operations [Amb+08] (note that shared randomness per se does not allow them to
communicate).
We are interested in bounding the average bias  = pwin − 1/2 of a quantum random access
code with shared randomness, where pwin is the winning probability averaged over x
$←−{0, 1}N and
i $←−{1, . . . , N}.
Lemma 2. The average bias of a quantum random access code with shared randomness that encodes
N bits into a d-dimensional quantum state is O(
√
N−1 log d). In particular, if N = 2n and d =
2poly(n) the bias is O(2−n/2 poly(n)).
27
Proof. A quantum random access code with shared randomness that encodes N bits into a d-
dimensional quantum state is specified by the following:
• a shared random variable λ,
• for each x ∈ {0, 1}N , a d-dimensional quantum state %λx encoding x,
• for each i ∈ {0, . . . , N}, an observable Mλi for recovering the i-th bit.
Formally, %λx and M
λ
i are d × d Hermitian matrices such that %λx ≥ 0, Tr%λx = 1, and ‖Mλi ‖ ≤ 1
where ‖Mλi ‖ denotes the operator norm of Mλi . Note that both %λx and Mλi depend on the shared
random variable λ, meaning that Alice and Bob can coordinate their strategies.
The bias of correctly guessing xi, for a given x and i, is given by
(−1)xiTr(%λxMλi )/2.
If the average bias of the code is  then
Eλ Ex,i(−1)xiTr(%λxMλi ) ≥ 2.
We can rearrange this expression and upper bound each term using its operator norm, and then
apply the noncommutative Khintchine inequality [TJ74]:
Eλ Ex
1
N
Tr
(
%λx
N∑
i=1
(−1)xiMλi
)
≤ Eλ Ex 1
N
‖
N∑
i=1
(−1)xiMλi ‖
≤ Eλ 1
N
c
√
N log d
= c
√
log d
N
,
for some constant c. In other words,
 ≤ c
2
√
log d
N
.
In the particular case we are interested in, d = 2poly(n) and N = 2n so
 ≤ c
2
√
poly(n)
2n
,
completing the proof.
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A.2 Classical key recovery
The following algorithm recovers the key using a linear number of classical decryption queries.
Algorithm 2: Classical Decryption-Access Key-Recovery
input : Classical decryption oracle UDeck for LWE-SKE(n, q, χ)
Parameter: M ∈ N
output: k˜ ∈ Znq
initialize: k˜← 0
for i← 1 to n do
initialize a list X[1 ..M ] of size M .
for m← 1 to M do
sample cm
$←−Zq;
query bm ← Deck(ei, cm), where ei = (0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0);
let X[m] = cm − bm
⌊ q
2
⌋
;
end
choose k˜i =
1
M
M∑
m=1
X[m];
end output: bk˜e ∈ Znq .
In the case of a classical encryption oracle with randomness-access, the following algorithm
(which also uses a linear number of queries) can be substituted.
Algorithm 3: Classical Randomness-Access Key-Recovery
input : Classical randomness-access oracle URAEnck for LWE-SKE(n, q, χ)
Parameter: M ∈ N
output: k˜ ∈ Znq
initialize: k˜← 0
for i← 1 to n do
initialize a list X[1 ..M ] of size M .
for m← 1 to M do
query X[m]← EncRAk (0, ei), where ei = (0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0);
end
choose k˜i =
1
M
M∑
m=1
X[m];
end output: bk˜e ∈ Znq .
A.3 Equivalence between two formulations of IND-QCCA1
Recall that the IND-QCCA1 notion is based on the security game IndGame defined in Definition 3. In
the alternative security game IndGame′ (see Definition 4), the adversary provides only one plaintext
m and must decide if the challenge is an encryption of m or an encryption of a random string. In
this section, we prove the following:
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Proposition 1. An encryption scheme Π is IND-QCCA1 if and only if for every QPT A,
Pr[A wins IndGame′(Π,A, n)] ≤ 1/2 + negl(n) .
Proof. Fix a scheme Π. For one direction, suppose Π is IND-QCCA1 and let A be an adversary
against IndGame′. Define an adversary A0 against IndGame as follows: (i.) run A until it out-
puts a challenge plaintext m, (ii.) sample random r and output (m, r), (iii.) run the rest of A
and output what it outputs. The output distribution of IndGame′(Π,A, n) is then identical to
IndGame(Π,A0, n), which in turn must be negligibly close to uniform by IND-QCCA1 security of Π.
For the other direction, suppose no adversary can win IndGame′ with probability better than
1/2, and let B be an adversary against IndGame. Now, define two adversaries B0 and B1 against
IndGame′ as follows. The adversary Bc does: (i.) run B until it outputs a challenge (m0,m1),
(ii.) output mc, (iii.) run the rest of B and output what it outputs. Note that the pre-challenge
algorithm is identical for B, B0, and B1; define random variables M0, M1 and R given by the two
challenges and a uniformly random plaintext, respectively. The post-challenge algorithm is also
identical for all three adversaries; call it C. The advantage of B over random guessing is then
bounded by
‖C(Enck(M0))− C(Enck(M1))‖1
= ‖C(Enck(M0))− C(Enck(M1))− C(Enck(R)) + C(Enck(R))‖1
≤ ‖C(Enck(M0))− C(Enck(R))‖1 + ‖C(Enck(M1))− C(Enck(R))‖1
≤ negl(n) ,
where the last inequality follows from our initial assumption, applied to both B0 and B1. It follows
that Π is IND-QCCA1.
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